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ABSTRACT 
When it comes to criminal investigation, time travel is increasingly possible.  Despite longstanding 
roots in traditional investigation, science is today providing something fundamentally different in 
the form of remarkably complete digital records.  And those big data records not only store our past, 
but thanks to data mining they are in many circumstances eerily good at predicting our future.  
So, now that we stand on the threshold of investigatory time travel, how should the Fourth 
Amendment and legislation respond?  How should we approach bulk government capture, such as 
by a solar-powered drone employing wide-area persistent stare technology?  Is it meaningfully 
different from civilian equivalents that find their way into government hands, whether it be 
tomorrow’s drone flight, or today’s record of all of our internet activity compiled by our internet 
service provider, or a current record of all of our movements compiled by our mobile phone 
company?  What of targeted time machines such as government over-seizure of digital data in 
every computer search?  This Article considers the benefits and costs of these miraculous time-
machine technologies, including as evidenced by several recent court opinions.  Considering the 
very serious privacy implications—from the individual to the relational and societal—we have 
good reason to be wary of their coming ubiquity.  Yet perhaps in very limited spheres we should 
welcome them, going so far as to entirely abandon front-end acquisition restrictions and rely solely 
upon ex post access, use, and disclosure limitations to protect the security in our persons, houses, 
papers, and effects.  I suggest that one such sphere might be law enforcement body cameras, an 
instance in which full capture has great benefits, and via which we can experiment upon the 
utility of solely ex post restraints. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Time travel fascinates, whether it is the 1895 science fiction of 
H.G. Wells,1 the 1985 humor of Back to the Future,2 or the 2015 Holly-
wood manifestations in Terminator Genisys,3 Project Almanac,4 and 
Tomorrowland.5  The reality is quite a bit more pedantic.  Astronauts 
travel into the future via the relativistic effects of time dilation, it is 
true, but in an amount measured in milliseconds.6  To do anything 
more impressive would require greater speeds than are currently pos-
sible.7  Gazing at the stars is seeing events of time past, it is true,8 but I 
can do the same by inserting a DVD or opening a book.  Travel into 
the past remains the domain and dispute of theoretical physics and 
its Einstein-Rosen Bridges, more commonly known as wormholes, 
 
 1 H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (1895). 
 2 BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1985). 
 3 TERMINATOR GENISYS (Paramount Pictures 2015).  
 4 PROJECT ALMANAC (Paramount Pictures 2015). 
 5 TOMORROWLAND (Walt Disney Pictures 2015).  Time travel has been a feature of hun-
dreds of films.  See Kenneth Krabat, All Time Travel Movies from 1896 and on, KENNETH 
KRABATS 1000 STEMMER (Oct. 30, 2015), http://krabat.menneske.dk/kkblog/all-time-
travel-movies/. 
 6 See Time Dilation, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_dilation (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2016). 
 7 Id. 
 8 How far is a light year?, EARTHSKY (Nov. 27, 2015), http://earthsky.org/astronomy-
essentials/how-far-is-a-light-year. 
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meaning that, so far as we know, traveling backwards in time might 
prove forever impossible.9  So much for science.10 
Yet when it comes to criminal investigation, time travel seems in-
creasingly possible.  It is not actually time travel, of course, and it has 
longstanding roots in traditional investigation.  But science has pro-
vided us remarkably complete historical records in the form of digital 
data.11  Well over a half century ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson recog-
nized that “it would, no doubt, simplify enforcement of all criminal 
laws if each citizen were required to keep a diary that would show 
where he was at all times, with whom he was, and what he was up 
to.”12  The law requires no such diary.  Only in certain sector-specific 
instances, such as banking, prescription records, or hotel registries, 
has the law itself created comprehensive records.13  Nonetheless, we 
increasingly create a diary like that Justice Jackson envisioned via our 
smartphones and online technologies, and we even helpfully carry it 
with us wherever we go.  Further, the National Security Agency 
(“NSA”) has demonstrated that data from various third party sources 
might be gathered, stored, and later queried for evidence of criminal-
ity (or, in that case, evidence of threats to national security).14  In 
short, we are “living in the golden age of surveillance.”15 
And lest we think criminal investigation can only offer that elusive 
travel back in time, developments in data mining and machine learn-
 
 9 See Wormhole, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wormhole (last visited Oct. 31, 
2015). 
 10 If my statements are proved dramatically wrong and we do learn to travel into the past, I 
will look to rewrite this. 
 11 See Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar Association Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 700–06 (2014) (chronicling the massive in-
crease in digital information). 
 12 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 71 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing against 
creation of the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination). 
 13 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2456 (2015) (striking down an ordinance 
giving police unrestricted and unchallengeable access to mandatory hotel guest regis-
tries); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600, 603–04 (1977) (permitting state prescrip-
tion registry against constitutional challenge); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 
(permitting government access to bank records required by Bank Secrecy Act of 1970).  
The most robust category of ongoing, population-wide acquisition and databasing would 
seem to be health information, but such acquisition has been little analyzed, perhaps be-
cause it is typically acquired for civil purposes.  But that of course does not take it outside 
of the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, and Wendy Mariner has written a critical analysis 
of this historic “pass.”  See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection 
for Health Information Privacy, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 935 (2016). 
 14 See infra at 940–43. 
 15 BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH:  THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND 
CONTROL YOUR WORLD 4 (2015). 
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ing are demonstrating that significant human behavior is predictable.  
For example, one study using mobile phone data found that location 
is 93% predictable,16 and based only upon Facebook “likes,” a com-
puter was able to better predict personality and personal problems, 
including substance abuse, than real-life friends.17  So, the more we 
learn about the past, the better we can predict the future.18  We have 
not reached anything like the world of Philip K. Dick’s The Minority 
Report with its mutant forward-seeing precogs,19 or the world of Lewis 
Padgett’s Private Eye with its ever-recording surroundings.20  But, as is 
so often the case, today’s science is creeping towards yesterday’s sci-
ence fiction. 
So what happens as technology increasingly permits capture of 
almost all information?  How should we, and our constitutional juris-
prudence, approach bulk government capture, such as by a solar-
powered drone employing wide-area persistent-stare technology,21 or 
by a massive system of interconnected ground cameras?22  Is it equiva-
 
 16 Chaoming Song et al., Limits of Predictability in Human Mobility, 327 SCIENCE 1018, 1021 
(2010), http://www.barabasilab.com/ pubs/ CCNR-ALB_Publications/ 201002-19_Science-
Predictability/ 201002-19_Science-Predictability.pdf; see also Dr Seldon, I Presume, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 23, 2013, at 76. 
 17 See  Clifton B. Parker, New Stanford Research Finds Computers Are Better Judges of Personality 
Than Friends and Family, STANFORD REP. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://news.stanford.edu/
news/2015/january/personality-computer-knows-011215.html; Wu Youyou et al., Comput-
er-based Personality Judgments Are More Accurate Than Those Made by Humans, 112 NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 1036, 1036–39 (2015), http://www.pnas.org/content/112/4/1036.full.pdf. 
 18 Police are increasingly interested in such prediction.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big 
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 369–73 (2015) (explaining 
predictive policing); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 
62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265–85 (2012) (same). 
 19 See The Minority Report, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Minority_Report 
(describing the film) (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). 
 20 Lewis Padgett, Private Eye, in MIRROR OF INFINITY:  A CRITIC’S ANTHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
FICTION 99 (Robert Silverberg ed. 1970). 
 21 See Ryan Gallagher, Could the Pentagon’s 1.8 Gigapixel Drone Camera Be Used for Domestic Sur-
veillance?, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.slate.com/ blogs/ future_
tense/ 2013/ 02/ 06/ ar-
gus_is_could_the_pentagon_s_1_8_gigapixel_drone_camera_be_used_for_domestic.html 
(describing government drone capability for data collection); Tyler Rogoway, Drones in 
Afghanistan Have the Most Advanced Aerial Surveillance Ever, FOXTROT ALPHA (Apr. 6, 2015, 
9:40 AM), http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/ drones-in-afghanistan-have-the-most-
advanced-aerial-sur-1695912540 (describing the aptly named Gorgon Stare Increment II, 
which combines images from 368 integrated cameras); Tyler Rogoway, How One New 
Drone Tech Finally Allows All-Seeing Surveillance, FOXTROT ALPHA (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:45 PM), 
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/ how-one-new-drone-tech-finally-allows-all-seeing-survei-
1553272901 (explaining several such technologies and both their utilities and their dan-
gers). 
 22 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers:  Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 35, 48–50 (2014) (describing New York’s "Domain Awareness System”); Somini 
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lent to a general warrant that can never be reasonable, or is that too 
simplistic an analogy?23  The general warrant permitted indiscrimi-
nate searching, not merely storing.  Is such direct gathering meaning-
fully different from what the government could obtain from a private 
party gathering such data, either by drone24 or by a vast network of 
interconnected cameras?25  Is it meaningfully different from what is 
available via an internet service provider that logs all of our online ac-
tivity?  Or from a mobile phone company tracking all of our move-
ments?  What about searches of our own devices that spy upon us, 
like our computers that log information we do not realize or desire?  
Can the government forever freeze and store that data, creating a 
mini, targeted time machine?  Can it do the same by recording every 
home that officers enter, perhaps via officer body cameras? 
While it may not be immediately obvious what to do about these 
disparate Fourth Amendment time machines, there is value in con-
sidering them for what they are.  We should consider how they affect 
the security in our persons, houses, papers, and effects.26  And we 
should consider their benefits to criminal investigation and, perhaps, 
separately to front-end deterrence.  We have always known that lim-
ited government norms like that expressed in the Fourth Amend-
ment are anti-accuracy:  if police could enter any home at will, or 
even were quartered there, we would have less crime.27  But life would 
be insufferable, and so we accept more crime in return for more lib-
 
Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-grows-in-
cities.html (describing systems in several cities). 
 23 The general warrant in the form of the writs of assistance was a major impetus for the 
American Revolution and for the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.  See Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886).  For an analysis of the Fourth Amendment law of 
government drone flight, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Hender-
son & Joseph Thai, Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 49, 65–72 (2015).  See also David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative 
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71–72 (2013) (citations omitted) (“In our view, the thresh-
old Fourth Amendment question should be whether a technology has the capacity to fa-
cilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations 
of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use 
of that technology is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or other 
government agents.”). 
 24 See generally Blitz et al., supra note 23, at 70–71 (explaining the First Amendment right to 
fly recording drones and its connection to the Fourth Amendment). 
 25 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell, A Light Bulb Goes On, Over the Mall, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2015, at 
B1 (describing systems of internet connected cameras placed in lighting). 
 26 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 27 See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 139 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment clearly embodies a judgment that some evidence of criminal activity may be 
lost for the sake of protecting property and privacy rights.”). 
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erty, while always attempting not only the ideal balance—whatever 
that might be—but also always seeking pareto superior moves that in-
crease one without lessening the other.  As science increasingly per-
mits capture without immediate human observation, does this call for 
a fundamental rethinking?  Should we in certain instances abandon 
entirely front-end limitations on capture so long as we are guaranteed 
evenhanded treatment that traditional investigation lacks, and back-
end limitations on access, use, and distribution?  Can we ever feel se-
cure if there is a government “database of ruin” that could be ac-
cessed at any moment?28  Yet can we turn our backs on the ability to 
save lives and livelihoods, and in a manner that uniformly distributes 
the privacy costs?29 
For some, perhaps the failed East German state and its Stasi is suf-
ficient answer, a view to which I am personally sympathetic.30  But, of 
course, access to those secret police files was not strictly circum-
scribed by fair legal process, and, more importantly, the data in the 
files were created by and for officers of the state.  Should the same 
rules apply when data are created for other, beneficial purposes, or 
will never be subject to human analysis except upon demonstrated 
cause?31  And if it becomes the case that, either on account of lack of 
political will, or perhaps on account of very broadly interpreted First 
Amendment rights, private third parties retain all data,32 is there a re-
alistic way to keep them out of government hands, or do the more 
important questions essentially once again amount to access, use, and 
 
 28 See Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug., 23, 2012), 
https://hbr.org/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin (arguing against thoughtless 
databasing in the private sphere). 
 29 The details of any such claim to decreasing crime would be difficult, and would typically 
rely less on preventing crime than on deterrence via raising the likelihood of apprehen-
sion and conviction, thereby raising crime’s expected cost.  Whereas ex ante detection via 
data mining is extremely difficult and in some contexts currently impossible, ex post sift-
ing through data to find then-evident connections is much easier.  See SCHNEIER, supra 
note 15, at 136–40.  And it is not hard to see that knowing everything tends to discourage 
crime and facilitate its apprehension. 
 30 See, e.g., GARY BRUCE, THE FIRM:  THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STASI (2010); ANNA FUNDER, 
STASILAND:  STORIES FROM BEHIND THE BERLIN WALL (2011); ROBERT H. SLOAN & 
RICHARD WARNER, THE SELF, THE STASI, THE NSA:  PRIVACY, KNOWLEDGE, AND COMPLICITY 
IN THE SURVEILLANCE STATE (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577308.  For a beautiful film fictionalizing some of the per-
sonal costs—and triumphs—of the human spirit in such surveillance conditions, see THE 
LIVES OF OTHERS (Sony Pictures 2006). 
 31 See, e.g., Persistent Stare Through Imagination, U. ARIZ. SCH. INFO.:  SCI., TECH., AND ARTS, 
http://w3.sista.arizona.edu/minds-eye.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2015) (seeking to build 
an artificially intelligent surveillance system). 
 32 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43, 367–71 (2010) (rec-
ognizing robust First Amendment rights of corporations). 
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disclosure?  If a store-everything world is so abhorrent—and I per-
sonally believe it might be—then why do we keep rushing towards 
precisely that?33 
Big questions rarely have small or singular answers, and this Arti-
cle will hardly provide either.  But it can begin the conversation or, 
more accurately, continue it under different framing.  It does so in 
the following manner.  Part I reminds us what the National Security 
Agency was attempting with its bulk telephone metadata collection, 
and then looks at two recent court decisions, one by a Second Circuit 
panel in United States v. Ganias (now headed en banc)34 and one from 
the United States Supreme Court in Riley v. California,35 each of which 
articulates a realization that historic digital data are meaningfully dif-
ferent for Fourth Amendment purposes.  It then considers the Su-
preme Court’s most recent Fourth Amendment decision, City of Los 
Angeles v. Patel, in which the Court floats the proposition that record-
keeping for purposes of deterrence might be a “special need” subject 
to more lenient Fourth Amendment rules.36  All three decisions and 
the NSA metadata program concern what might be considered 
Fourth Amendment time machines. 
Part II canvasses the important principles of information privacy 
that are at stake.  Part III then travels back in time to consider a 1995 
proposal by Harold Krent in which he argues the Fourth Amendment 
should employ use restrictions upon data law enforcement has lawful-
ly acquired.37  The Second Circuit panel in Ganias would have recog-
 
 33 Information security expert and frequent commentator Bruce Schneier declared “game 
over” in 2013: 
So, we’re done.  Welcome to a world where Google knows exactly what sort of 
porn you all like, and more about your interests than your spouse does.  Welcome 
to a world where your cell phone company knows exactly where you are all the 
time.  Welcome to the end of private conversations, because increasingly your 
conversations are conducted by e-mail, text, or social networking sites. 
And welcome to a world where all of this, and everything else that you do or is 
done on a computer, is saved, correlated, studied, passed around from company to 
company without your knowledge or consent . . . . Welcome to an Internet without 
privacy, and we’ve ended up here with hardly a fight. 
  Bruce Schneier, The Internet Is a Surveillance State, CNN, (Mar. 16, 2013, 2:04 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance/index.html.  
Perhaps, however, at least some of the problem is one of market failure that could be 
remedied via regulation requiring internalizing of privacy harms.  See A. Michael 
Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution:  Learning from Environmental Im-
pact Statements, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1713, 1728–37 (2015). 
 34 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 35 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 36 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015). 
 37 Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks:  Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995). 
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nized such a restriction.38  It would of course be a significant further 
move to argue that the Fourth Amendment might be satisfied by such 
restrictions alone, a move I believe is fraught with great danger in 
most contexts.  But perhaps there are limited contexts in which a 
move to solely use restrictions is one that legislatures, courts, agen-
cies, and commentators should at least debate, if not begin to exper-
iment with.  Particularly when designed by legislatures, perhaps pro-
grams of uniform applicability should generally be considered 
constitutionally reasonable.  And if there is any chance we are ever to 
rely solely upon back-end limitations in the world of Fourth Amend-
ment time machines, it would be best to start learning now, in smaller 
spheres, whether such means can ever alone guarantee the securities 
promised by the Fourth Amendment.  Thus, perhaps an ideal sphere 
for experimentation might be officer body cameras.  Here the bene-
fits of always recording are sufficiently great, and the domain suffi-
ciently narrow, that it seems reasonable—and perhaps wise—to al-
ways record and to rely upon access, use, and disclosure limitations to 
protect our security interests. 
I.  THE NSA, HARD DRIVES, CELL PHONES, AND HOTEL REGISTRIES 
On June 6, 2013, Glenn Greenwald broke the first story based up-
on the disclosures of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.39  Pur-
suant to an order from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, Verizon Business was providing the National Security Agency, 
“on an ongoing daily basis,” “all call detail records or ‘telephony 
metadata’ created . . . for communications (i) between the United 
States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including 
local telephone calls.”40  “Telephony metadata” was defined to in-
clude “originating and terminating telephone number” and “time 
and duration of the call.”41  The NSA was creating a database of all 
telephone calls made on the Verizon Business network.  Similar or-
 
 38 See infra at 945–46. 
 39 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, 
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ world/ 2013/ jun/ 06/ nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order.  Many others would follow.  See GLENN GREENWALD, 
NO PLACE TO HIDE:  EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 90–
169 (2014) (discussing the programs Snowden disclosed). 
 40 Secondary Order, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-80, at 1–2 (FISC Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/ world/ interactive/ 2013/ jun/ 06/ verizon-telephone-data-
court-order. 
 41 Id. at 2. 
Feb. 2016] FOURTH AMENDMENT TIME MACHINES 941 
 
ders were issued to other carriers, such that the NSA was databasing 
virtually all telephone calls made or received in the United States.42 
Why?  Perhaps no program of surveillance is surprising for an 
agency that eerily declares its “collection posture” as “Sniff it All—
Know it All—Collect it All—Process it All—Exploit it All—Partner 
[Share] it All.”43  But why in particular did the NSA want to gather 
these phone records?  Because the NSA wanted a time machine.44  Say 
on August 1, 2015, the agency obtained reason to believe a particular 
telephone number, 301-688-6524, was being used by a terrorist.  That 
might lead to a court order requiring the provider to place a pen reg-
ister and trap and trace device on that line,45 but of course the line 
might at this point be abandoned, or at least this would not reveal 
communications made in the past.  So, a court order might require 
the provider to produce historic records.46  Only the provider might 
have retained those records for only a limited duration.  Moreover, 
the NSA wanted guaranteed access not only to the numbers with 
which 301-688-6524 had communicated (first “hop”), but also the 
numbers with which those first hop numbers had communicated (se-
cond “hop”), and further the numbers with which those second hop 
persons had communicated (third “hop”).47  The amount of data is 
growing exponentially, such that if each telephone number commu-
nicated with one hundred others, the NSA is looking at one million 
records.  Quite convenient, then, to have everything stored and ready 
to query in their own servers.  Time machines are handy like that.48 
The NSA claimed statutory authorization to create this “historical 
repository”49 was found in Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.50  
 
 42 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796–97 (2d Cir. 2015); PRIVACY 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM 
CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF 
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8 (2014), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/
pclob-215.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT]. 
 43 Greenwald, supra note 39, at 97. 
 44 This particular time machine would also be useful as, over time, the world’s largest social 
network map. 
 45 See 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012) (authorizing approved use of pen register or trap and trade 
device for investigation). 
 46 See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (authorizing such orders). 
 47 See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 797; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at 9, 28–29. 
 48 The bulk telephony metadata program was not the NSA’s only time machine.  See, e.g., 
Bruce Schneier, More about the NSA’s XKEYSCORE, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (July 7, 2015, 
6:38 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/07/more_about_the_.html 
(explaining another program by which the NSA pulled massive amounts of internet data 
from fiber optic backbone cables). 
 49 Clapper, 785 F.3d at 812. 
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Whether or not it would be ideal to create such time machines, the 
NSA was certainly wrong in claiming it had been granted here.51  
Thus, the co-author of USA PATRIOT worked to enact legislation 
that has, for now, shut down this particular program, at least in the 
sense that the telephone records are no longer being centralized 
from all providers and held by the government.52  But this has not 
been the first such government attempt,53 and it would be startling if 
it is the last.  There is nothing particularly special about telephone 
numbers that make them the only useful time machine metadata:  
the same use could be made of financial, internet, and other data.54  
In rejecting the NSA’s contention that its bulk collection satisfied the 
required relevance threshold, the Second Circuit reasoned as follows: 
If information can be deemed relevant solely because of its necessity to a 
particular process that the government has chosen to employ, regardless 
of its subject matter, then so long as “the government develops an effec-
tive means of searching through everything in order to find some-
thing, . . . everything becomes relevant to its investigations”—and the gov-
 
 50 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (“USA PATRIOT ACT”) Act of 2001 § 215, Pub. L. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT 
Act]. 
 51 See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 812–21 (holding that Section 215 did not authorize the telephony 
data collection program); PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at 10 (“conclud[ing] that Sec-
tion 215 does not provide an adequate legal basis to support the [telephone records] 
program”); Stephen E. Henderson, A Rose By Any Other Name:  Regulating Law Enforcement 
Bulk Metadata Collection, 94 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 28 (2016) (same). 
 52 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Disci-
pline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (“USA FREEDOM Act of 2015”) §§ 101–10, Pub. L. 
114-23, 129 Stat. 268-76 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861); Lisa Mascaro, House Over-
whelmingly Approves Bill to Curb NSA Domestic Spying, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-nsa-reforms-20140523-story.html.  Accord-
ing to Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, the NSA interpretation was “like scooping up 
the entire ocean to guarantee you catch a fish.”  Jennifer Valentino-DeVries & Siobhan 
Gorman, Secret Court Ruling Expanded Spy Powers, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2013, at A4. 
 53 For years, the DEA collected massive amounts of telephone metadata for international 
calls under its administrative subpoena authority, an apparent precursor to the NSA bulk 
collection.  See Brad Heath, U.S. Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY 
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-
surveillance-operation/70808616/.  And there was of course the ill-fated Total Infor-
mation Awareness program.  See Joshua Partlow, Senate Votes to Deny Funding To Computer 
Surveillance Effort, WASH. POST, July 19, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
business/2003/07/19/senate-votes-to-deny-funding-to-computer-surveillance-
effort/251243f1-8a66-4693-9970-f714130b783f/ (discussing the Senate’s denial of funding 
to the Total Information Awareness initiative, a computer surveillance program that 
would enable the government to amass and search databases of records for potential ter-
rorist activity). 
 54 Clapper, 785 F.3d at 818. 
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ernment’s “technological capacity to ingest information and sift through 
it efficiently” would be the only limit to what is relevant.55 
This criticism, first made by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, is a fair criticism of the NSA’s interpretation of “relevance,” in 
that it is an interpretation inconsistent with legal tradition.  But no-
tice the proposition is not illogical:  if later searches would prove use-
ful in investigating national security threats (or crime), the existence 
of the database is relevant to a legitimate government role, and the 
program did include audit, security, and reporting requirements.56 
But again, in this case it was clear this novel interpretation was not 
one Congress intended.  The Second Circuit was correct that: 
Such expansive development of government repositories of formerly pri-
vate records would be an unprecedented contraction of the privacy ex-
pectations of all Americans.  Perhaps such a contraction is required by 
national security needs in the face of the dangers of contemporary do-
mestic and international terrorism.  But we would expect such a momen-
tous decision to be preceded by substantial debate, and expressed in 
unmistakable language.57 
Instead, USA PATRIOT and its legislative sponsors intended, and 
therefore used, the traditional language of legal relevance.58  But 
what if the debate occurred and that unmistakable language did 
come about?  Then there would of course be the question of whether 
it is a method of investigation the Constitution will abide.  Although 
the Second Circuit did not decide this constitutional issue, it recog-
nized the issue as “one of the most difficult issues in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence:  the extent to which modern technology alters 
our traditional expectations of privacy.”59 
Is this an issue of technology?  After all, was not the first investigat-
ing “time machine” an officer taking notes on what she hears and 
sees, not to mention the myriad recordkeeping requirements im-
posed by the modern industrial State?  Three recent decisions shed 
more light on this issue:  a panel decision in the Second Circuit (now 
headed en banc) considering a digital time machine in the form of 
 
 55 Id. at 818 n.10 (quoting PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, at 62). 
 56 Id. at 797–98 (terming them “minimization procedures”); PCLOB REPORT, supra note 42, 
at 33–36.  Those requirements did not, however, protect data that had been found re-
sponsive to seed queries and thus was placed in the NSA “corporate store.”  PCLOB 
REPORT, supra note 42, at 30–31.  In other words, access to once responsive data was 
thereafter unrestricted. 
 57 Clapper, 785 F.3d at 818. 
 58 Id. at 811. 
 59 Id. at 822. 
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government preservation of private computer hard drives,60 a deci-
sion by the United States Supreme Court considering a voluntarily 
compiled and carried digital time machine in the form of a mobile 
phone,61 and another decision by the Supreme Court considering 
much more old-fashioned recordkeeping in the form of a hotel guest 
registry.62 
A.  Ganias and Preservation of Hard Drives 
In November of 2003, federal agents executed a search warrant on 
the accounting offices of Stavros Ganias.63  Ganias himself was not the 
target, but rather the Army was investigating one of his clients with 
whom the Army contracted.64  The agents executing the warrant 
therefore did not remove Ganias’s three computers, respecting his as 
an ongoing business, but instead mirrored the hard drives, making 
exact duplications thereof.65  Forensics examiners thereafter copied 
that data onto two sets of identical DVDs, thereby preserving the gov-
ernment originals from any harm occasioned by access.66 
That access would not occur for eight months, until July 2004, 
when Army forensics agents began to review the DVDs pursuant to 
the search warrant.67  When they discovered the suspect business 
might have committed tax fraud, they shared a copy of the data with 
the IRS,68 and together the two sets of investigators ultimately identi-
fied all responsive material by December of 2004.69  Nonetheless, the 
agents did nothing to try and delete or return the non-responsive ma-
terial.  Unlike for seized physical items, these agents never consider 
deleting or returning non-responsive digital data.70  “[Y]ou never 
know what data you may need in the future,” testified one.71 
In July of 2005, some twenty months after the search of Ganias’s 
office and corresponding seizure of his computer data, Army and IRS 
investigators came to believe that Ganias might have been underre-
 
 60 United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 791 F.3d 290 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 61 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 62 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447 (2015). 
 63 Ganias, 755 F.3d at 128. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 129. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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porting income, and therefore expanded their investigation to in-
clude him as a suspect.72  They therefore wanted to have another look 
at his files, but appropriately did not consider their mere possession 
of those files to authorize further searches thereof.73 
To understand why, one must first consider traditional searches 
and basic Fourth Amendment law.  When police search a home pur-
suant to a warrant, they may look only where sought-after items can 
be.74  And they may seize only things the warrant authorizes, or things 
so located for which authority for seizure is “immediately apparent,” 
such as child pornography or obviously illegal drugs.75  These things 
are said to be in “plain view.”76  So, for example, police searching for 
a large knife should not open a small book at all—it cannot contain 
the sought-after knife, and therefore is not subject to search.  Where-
as police searching for a knife and any threatening communications 
could peruse the small book.  But upon finding it to contain entirely 
unrelated material, police of course must leave the book behind un-
less that material is independently subject to seizure, meaning the of-
ficer has probable cause to believe it either the fruit of crime (it ap-
pears to be a rare book that was reported stolen), an instrumentality 
of crime (it appears to be the very book used to lure a young victim), 
contraband (it appears to contain child pornography), or evidence of 
crime (it appears to contain the planning for a recent bank rob-
bery).77  In rare instances, large quantities of physical documents 
might be impossible to sort onsite, but then special rules are to be fol-
lowed.78 
With computers, everything is done differently.  Because they con-
tain so much disparate data, and in so many formats, police cannot 
reasonably be expected to bring experts to sufficiently sort through it 
on site.79  Thus, courts all permit over-seizure of digital evidence in eve-
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 129, 133 n.7. 
 74 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140–41 (1990). 
 75 Id. at 136–37. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967). 
 78 Ganias, 755 F.3d at 135 (citing United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
 79 See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING 
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 76–79 
(2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/
ssmanual2009.pdf.  For an analysis of the law regulating the forensic search, see Stephen 
E. Henderson, What Alex Kozinski and the Investigation of Earl Bradley Teach About Searching 
and Seizing Computers and the Dangers of Inevitable Discovery, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 115, 130–36 
(2013). 
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ry instance:  the entire hard drive, say, can be seized even though 
much, most, or even all of its contents—entire libraries of digital ma-
terials, let alone files arguably equivalent to that small book found in 
the hypothetical home search—are in fact entirely innocent.80 
Investigators have thus obtained a time machine.  Following the 
November 2003 execution of the search warrant, Ganias modified the 
relevant files.81  Therefore, had the government not over-seized and 
then retained digital content that it knew was not relevant to the first 
investigation, and therefore which was not covered by the original 
warrant, this evidence would not have existed.82  Yet because agents 
did retain not only the exact copies of his hard drive but also the 
DVDs, the data did exist.  And they might retain such data for ten, 
twenty, or a hundred years.83  So, pursuant to another warrant ob-
tained in April 2006—some two-and-a-half years after the data’s sei-
zure—the government once again searched the data and found in-
criminating evidence.  Time machines are handy like that. 
The Second Circuit panel addressed just this time machine func-
tionality, although its opinion is now vacated pending en banc re-
view84:   
[W]e consider a [] limited question:  whether the Fourth Amendment 
permits officials executing a warrant for the seizure of particular data on 
a computer to seize and indefinitely retain every file on that computer 
for use in future criminal investigations.  We hold that is does not.85   
The over two-year retention of Ganias’s unresponsive data, retained a 
year and a half after the government had concluded it was non-
responsive, violated the Fourth Amendment.86  Or, at the very least, 
its use in a future criminal investigation did.87 
 
 80 See Ganias, 755 F.3d at 135–36 (collecting cases). 
 81 Id. at 130. 
 82 Id. at 130, 138 n.11. 
 83 For the various FBI retention policies, see Records Control Schedules, NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/
?dir=/departments/department-of-justice/rg-0065; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, A GUIDE TO CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN FBI RECORDS 
(2010), https://www.fbi.gov/foia/a-guide-to-conducting-research-in-fbi-records.  The 
harms are of course even greater when law enforcement has seized the originals and not 
merely image copies.  See, e.g., United States v. Gladding, 775 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 
2014) (requiring the government to prove it is not feasible to disaggregate, and then re-
turn, innocent over-seized data). 
 84 Ganias, 791 F.3d 290. 
 85 Ganias, 755 F.3d at 137.  Cf. United States v. Johnston, 789 F.3d 934, 941–43 (9th Cir. 
2015) (holding, without considering Ganias, that a five-year delay in searching a comput-
er pursuant to the original warrant is not constitutionally problematic). 
 86 Ganias, 755 F.3d at 138.  In so holding, the court importantly sided with those arguing 
Fourth Amendment seizure is implicated by any meaningful deprivation in the exclusive 
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I agree, though I differ from the panel’s reasoning.  The panel be-
lieved the government’s position would mean that “every warrant to 
search for particular electronic data would become, in essence, a 
general warrant.”88  That does not seem quite apt, as a general war-
rant permitted the executive to search anyone’s house for information 
of interest,89 or at least one person’s house for anything incriminat-
ing,90 whereas both in 2003 and in 2006 the government obtained a 
warrant demonstrating particularized suspicion towards Ganias’s da-
ta, and in each instance agents thereafter only looked for the respon-
sive data.  Instead, the government’s position would turn every com-
puter warrant into an investigative time machine. 
It is a serious invasion if the government can over-seize massive 
amounts of private information and forever retain it for indefinite 
later search.  One can understand the concern of the government, 
which is that if the data are not retained in their original form it 
might be difficult to answer later claims of unreasonable search or 
challenges to authentication.91  But, like the panel, I do not see that 
 
possession of property.  Id. at 137 (“The Government’s retention of copies of Ganias’s 
personal computer records for two-and-a-half years deprived him of exclusive control over 
those files for an unreasonable amount of time. . . . This was a meaningful interference 
with Ganias’s possessory rights in those files and constituted a seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”).  See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 10, 12 (2005) (arguing for such an interpretation). 
 87 Ganias, 755 F.3d at 139 (“[E]ven if we assumed it were necessary to maintain a complete 
copy of the hard drive solely to authenticate evidence responsive to the original warrant, 
that does not provide a basis for using the mirror image for any other purpose.”).  Id. at 
138 (“[T]he Government clearly violated Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining 
the files for a prolonged period of time and then using them in a future criminal investiga-
tion.” (emphasis added)).  Id. at 139 (“Because the Government has demonstrated no le-
gal basis for retaining the non-responsive documents, its retention and subsequent search of 
those documents were unconstitutional.” (emphasis added)); id. at 141 (“We conclude 
that the Government violated Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by seizing and indefi-
nitely retaining non-responsive computer records, and then searching them when it later de-
veloped probable cause.” (emphasis added)). 
 88 Id. at 139. 
 89 See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:  ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 
602–1791, at 233 (2009).  Thus, a warrant for stolen sheep in 1749 instructed the local 
constable to “diligently search every suspected House and Place within your Parish, which 
you and the . . . [owner of the sheep] shall think convenient to search.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  A 1661 warrant authorized the executive “to make diligent 
search . . . throughout the whole town of Milford and the precincts thereof . . . ; and this 
to be in all dwelling houses, barnes or other buildings whatsoever, and vessels in the har-
bor.”  Id. at 234–36 (citations omitted). 
 90 See, e.g., United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a 
warrant permitting seizure of “evidence of crime” as an impermissible general warrant). 
 91 See Ganias, 755 F.3d at 139; Recent Cases, Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure and Evi-
dence Retention—Second Circuit Creates a Potential “Right to Deletion” of Imaged Hard Drives.—
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as an impossible hurdle.92  So, perhaps the panel’s answer is broadly 
the right answer:  maybe the Fourth Amendment bans even relatively 
small digital time machines, no matter how useful, no matter how 
regulated, and no matter how democratically conceived and applied.  
The government can retain the data for its original purposes as long 
as it must, but cannot search the data for any other.  Or, perhaps 
such time machines are only permissible where government need is 
at its highest, such as for purposes of national security, or where the 
retention was pursuant to a carefully structured—and fairly inclu-
sive—legislative authorization.  I will return to these questions below.  
The immediate point is merely to highlight that digital evidence has 
made these questions increasingly pressing. 
The Supreme Court came to the same realization when it consid-
ered searches of cell phones incident to lawful arrest. 
B.  Riley and Searches of Cell Phones 
David Riley was stopped for a minor traffic infraction, his car was 
searched pursuant to impoundment, and he was arrested for illegally 
possessing two handguns found therein.93  As police are permitted to 
do as a routine incident of any lawful arrest,94 officers searched Riley’s 
person and found a smartphone in his pocket.95  A search of that 
phone onsite and a couple of hours later at the station yielded rele-
vant evidence in the form of incriminating text messages, videos, and 
images.96 
The Supreme Court consolidated Riley’s case with that of Brima 
Wurie, who was arrested following an apparent drug sale.97  At the po-
lice station, officers seized two phones from his person, and one of 
them—a flip phone—continued to receive calls from a number the 
phone identified as “my house.”98  Officers opened the phone and 
accessed the call log, thereby obtaining the phone number associated 
with these calls.99 
The Court resoundingly rejected both searches: 
 
United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014)., 128 HARV. L. REV. 743, 748–50 
(2014). 
 92 Ganias, 755 F.3d at 139. 
 93 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
 94 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973). 
 95 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
 96 Id. at 2480–81. 
 97 Id. at 2481. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
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Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience.  
With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Ameri-
cans “the privacies of life.”  [quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
630 (1886)]  The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry 
such information in his hand does not make the information any less 
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.  Our answer to 
the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized 
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.100 
Established doctrine would allow similar searches of non-digital 
containers immediately associated with an arrestee’s person, includ-
ing any found in the same pocket as Riley’s phone.101  So, why did all 
nine Justices reject these mobile phone searches?  Lacking both 
precedent and any “precise guidance from the founding era,”102 the 
Court had to make its own assessment of what constitutes an “unrea-
sonable” search,103 and that is done “by assessing, on the one hand, 
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legit-
imate governmental interests.”104 
The governmental interests motivating searches incident to ar-
rest—officer safety and evidence preservation105—are not particularly 
relevant to this Article.  But, very briefly, what swayed the Court was 
that the interests are generally less significant in the digital context.106  
As for officer safety, there is no possibility the digital data will harm 
the arresting officers, unlike, say, a surreptitious knife or razor 
blade.107  As for the remote possibility the data would inform officers 
of indirect harm—for example, that dangerous confederates were en 
route—the Court properly held this to be a case-specific exigent cir-
 
100 Id. at 2494–95; see also id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring in part and in the judgment but 
expressing reservations with the majority’s limiting theory of search incident to arrest and 
expressing a willingness to reconsider if legislatures lead the way); United States v. 
Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 941–43 (9th Cir. 2014) (extending Riley’s protection of mobile 
phones to exempt them from the automobile exception to the warrant requirement). 
101 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (discussing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), 
which distinguished between searches of items “immediately associated with the person of 
the arrestee” and those otherwise within the arrestee’s reach (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
at 15)). 
102 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (recognizing that not only was there no equivalent at the time of 
the founding, but that even the less sophisticated flip-phones “are based on technology 
nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago”). 
103 Id. at 2482 (“As the [Fourth Amendment] text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
403 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
104 Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
105 Id. at 2483 (explaining the genesis of these twin aims). 
106 See id. at 2485–88 (applying the criteria to mobile phones). 
107 Id. at 2485. 
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cumstance sufficiently accounted for by that doctrine.108  In other 
words, it will be the exception, not the rule.  Similarly, there is little 
risk of evidence destruction once the officers seize the mobile phone, 
as even the typically negligible possibility of the device being remotely 
wiped can be countered with a Faraday bag, the cheap version of 
which is wrapping the phone in aluminum foil.109 
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the privacy in-
terest in digital data is very significant, both in terms of quality and 
quantity.110  While the government urged “that a search of all data 
stored on a cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from” searches 
of wallets and purses, to the Court, “[t]hat is like saying a ride on 
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the 
moon.”111 
As for quality, “[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct 
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank 
statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any 
isolated record.”112  As for quantity, a “phone’s capacity allows even 
just one type of information to convey far more than previously pos-
sible.”113  Such is the marvel of digital data and its modern storage.114  
Indeed, “it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% 
of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digi-
tal record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to 
the intimate.”115  It did not come at government behest, as Justice 
Jackson feared in 1948, but it came nonetheless.116  Each such person 
is carrying a time machine, and the Court has now recognized how 
especially private are the digital data contained therein.  As the Court 
 
108 Id. at 2485–86. 
109 Id. at 2486–88.  The government also raised, for the first time before the Supreme Court, 
that the officers might be able to immediately access the data before the phone “locks,” at 
which point encryption might render the data unreachable even pursuant to a valid war-
rant.  Id. at 2486–87.  The Court had two responses.  First, officers who encounter an un-
locked phone and who have probable cause can perhaps take the minimal steps necessary 
to turn off the auto-locking feature.  Id. at 2487–88.  Moreover, this situation—like the 
possibility of dangerous confederates texting of their approach—is sufficiently unlikely 
that it is otherwise properly handled via exigent circumstances.  Id. at 2487. 
110 Id. at 2489. 
111 Id. at 2488. 
112 Id. at 2489 (explaining that mobile phones “could just as easily be called cameras, video 
players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, 
or newspapers”). 
113 Id. 
114 See Henderson, supra note 11, at 700–03 (chronicling the massive increase in digital stor-
age). 
115 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
116 See supra note 12. 
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recognized, a single mobile phone will often contain more infor-
mation than an entire home.117  Time machines are useful like that.  
In the words of the Court, “In the cell phone context, . . . it is reason-
able to expect that incriminating information will be found on a 
phone regardless of when the crime occurred.”118 
So, while Riley perhaps left things unanswered that it could have 
addressed,119 it made very clear that when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment, digital is different.  And while compelled government 
access therefore required a warrant, this does not necessarily mean 
the Court is generally averse to the existence of digital time ma-
chines.  The Court’s most recent Fourth Amendment decision, which 
considered records that could be either analog or digital, contains a 
facially surprising claim that is a nod to time machines’ utility. 
C.  Patel and Searches of Hotel Registries 
City of Los Angeles v. Patel is a case about mini, government-
mandated time machines in the form of hotel guest registries.120  A 
provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code requires that hotels 
record and maintain information about their guests, including name 
and address, vehicle license plate of any car parked on the premises, 
and method of payment.121  Under certain circumstances additional 
identification information must be recorded, such as when a guest 
pays by cash, rents a room without a reservation, or stays for fewer 
 
117 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.  The Court had previously rejected the claim that officers could 
search an entire home incident to arrest.  Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 753, 755, 
768 (1969); see also 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. v. New York County 
Dist. Attorney’s Off., 2015 WL 4429025, at *7 (N.Y.S.3d July 21, 2015) (“Our holding to-
day [that there is neither a constitutional nor statutory right to challenge of a search war-
rant other than a defendant’s motion to suppress] does not mean that we do not appre-
ciate Facebook’s concerns about the scope of the bulk warrants issued here or about the 
District Attorney’s alleged right to indefinitely retain the seized accounts of the un-
charged Facebook users.  Facebook users share more intimate personal information 
through their Facebook accounts than may be revealed through rummaging about one’s 
home.  These bulk warrants demanded ‘all’ communications in 24 broad categories from 
the 381 targeted accounts.  Yet, of the 381 targeted Facebook user accounts only 62 were 
actually charged with any crime.”). 
118 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492. 
119 See generally Ric Simmons, The Missed Opportunities of Riley v. California, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 253 (2014) (arguing that the Riley Court did not “repair the critically flawed 
search incident to arrest doctrine” or “provide useful guidance for law enforcement offic-
ers faced with emerging technologies”). 
120 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2447–48 (2015). 
121 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 41.49(2)(a) (2008), http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2006/
06-0125-s1_ord_179533.pdf. 
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than twelve hours.122  Registry information must be maintained for a 
period of ninety days, and must be made available upon officer re-
quest.123  As the recent publicity regarding the hack of cheating or 
“adultery” website Ashley Madison demonstrates,124 it is not hard to 
imagine some of the privacy interests implicated by knowledge of ho-
tel stays.125 
At the same time, such a recordkeeping requirement is hardly 
novel, and the hotels did not challenge it.126  A group of hotel opera-
tors did, however, challenge the provision requiring that the registry 
“shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police De-
partment for inspection.”127  They contended such unrestrained ac-
cess violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and a closely divided 
Supreme Court agreed.128  According to the five Justice majority, the 
officer demand requirement is unconstitutional because it offers no 
opportunity for pre-compliance legal challenge,129 essentially combin-
ing the ease of an administrative subpoena with the effectiveness of a 
warrant.  Patel is an important opinion, because it permits meaningful 
facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment,130 and because it lim-
 
122 Id. § 41.49(4). 
123 Id. § 41.49(3)(a). 
124 See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, a Dating Website, Says Hackers May Have Data on 
Millions, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/technology/
hacker-attack-reported-on-ashley-madison-a-dating-service.html; Emma Johnson, Ashley 
Madison Hack Would Mean ‘Boon for Divorce Lawyers and Marriage Therapists,’ FORBES (July 
20, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/emmajohnson/2015/07/20/ashley-madison-
hack-would-mean-boon-for-divorce-lawyers-and-marriage-therapists/. 
125 See, e.g., Tina Kelly, Mayflower Mystery:  Room 871, Where Are You?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 
2008), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/20/mayflower-mystery-room-871-
where-are-you/ (detailing how Governor Eliot Spitzer enjoyed the services of a prostitute 
in The Mayflower’s room 871); Sarah Kershaw & Michael Powell, Just a Hotel?  For Some, 
It’s an Adventure, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2008, at G1 (generally describing prostitution at 
the Mayflower Hotel). 
126 Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2454 (“Respondents have not challenged and nothing in our opinion 
calls into question those parts of § 41.49 that require hotel operators to maintain guest 
registries containing certain information.”). 
127 L.A., CAL. MUN. CODE, supra note 121, at § 41.49(3)(a). 
128 Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2451. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 2449 (“We first clarify that facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not 
categorically barred or especially disfavored.”).  Even with facial challenges theoretically 
available, they could never be successful if defeated by the possibility that an officer pos-
sessing a valid warrant could make the records request, that an officer in an emergency could 
make the records request, or that the subject of a request could consent.  Fortunately, the 
Court recognized an unrestricted access statute can be facially unconstitutional regardless 
of those possibilities, because they are properly understood as independent from the 
grounds of a statutory access not requiring any of them.  Id. at 2450–51.  Cf. id. at 2464–66 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing otherwise). 
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its what has been a nebulous “closely regulated industry exception.”131  
But what is of interest for this Article is the Court’s dictum regarding 
deterrence. 
The Court assumed, without deciding, that the government pur-
pose for the registry program was a “special need” outside of ordinary 
crime control, thus lessening the Fourth Amendment burden.132  
Since the ordinance was clearly aimed at solving crime, it is hard to 
imagine what this special need would be.  Although the boundaries 
have always been unclear, in the automobile context, for example, 
the Court has differentiated roadblocks aimed at preventing highway 
fatalities and carnage (a special need), from those aimed at interdict-
ing drugs (ordinary crime control).133  Officers accessing the historic 
registry were unlikely to prevent imminent threatened harm akin to 
that posed by drunk drivers, as opposed to finding the clues necessary 
to prosecute past offenses.  This seems true by definition for a registry 
dating back three months. 
Yet the Court assumed a special need, namely deterring criminali-
ty.134  It seems hard to imagine deterrence of criminality can be a 
meaningful special need:  deterrence is not the reason for legitimate 
police investigation that constitutes a search or a seizure, but instead 
is the happy—albeit very important—byproduct of investigating actu-
al crime.  In other words, surely police cannot routinely make war-
rantless entry into homes and claim the “special need” of deterring 
crimes that might otherwise be committed therein.  Instead, when 
law enforcement officers enter homes pursuant to lawful warrants or 
exceptions thereto, and people learn of those events including sub-
 
131 Id. at 2454–56.  The Court has declared four closely regulated industries, for which it 
permits systems of routine, suspicionless inspection:  liquor distribution, firearms distri-
bution, mining, and automobile junkyards.  Id. at 2454.  Before Patel, it was unclear 
whether a legislature could effectively get around the Fourth Amendment: subject a busi-
ness to sufficient regulation, such that it is pervasively regulated, and now the Fourth 
Amendment has little play.  The Court majority signaled this would not be possible, find-
ing the exception to apply only when something “inherent in the operation of [the busi-
ness] poses a clear and significant risk to the public welfare.”  Id.  This remains somewhat 
nebulous, especially given the disparate existing four categories, but at least it is a more 
limited sort of nebulous. 
132 Id. at 2452. 
133 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (striking down drug interdic-
tion checkpoints); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (allow-
ing sobriety checkpoints). 
134 Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2452 (“Here, we assume that the searches authorized by § 41.49 serve a 
‘special need’ other than conducting criminal investigations:  They ensure compliance 
with the recordkeeping requirement, which in turn deters criminals from operating on 
the hotels’ premises.”). 
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sequent prosecutions, they are deterred from themselves engaging in 
such criminality. 
So, why the odd assertion of deterrence as a special need?  Pre-
sumably because of the intuition that the registry requirement, like 
other and more significant time machines, is an effective—and per-
haps smart—way to go after criminal behavior.  But even if that might 
be so, the Court was right to find problematic the complete absence 
of access restrictions given the privacy interests at stake.  Indeed, it is 
worth stepping back to broadly consider these interests of infor-
mation privacy before contemplating what they implicate for investi-
gatory time machines. 
II.  PRIVACY 
As integral as privacy is to most of our lives—or at least as integral 
as I believe it is to mine—there is considerable controversy and con-
fusion as to its definition, including as to whether it is a state of being 
or a right.135  In other words, is “perfect” privacy achieved only when 
nobody has any information about and access to my person (which 
sounds rather awful), or also when I have complete control over 
those modes of access but have volitionally granted them in certain 
amounts (which sounds rather utopian)?136  Learned philosophical 
minds have debated these concepts for years and presumably will for 
as long as there are philosophers to debate.  My less philosophically 
tutored mind finds useful—and for criminal procedure purposes 
seemingly sufficient—the construct that information privacy is the abil-
ity of a person to control what information about her is given to oth-
ers, and for what purposes.137  Such a control construct was most no-
 
135 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 425–28 (1980) (argu-
ing privacy is a “condition of life,” not a claim or form of control).  See generally 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:  AN ANTHOLOGY (Ferdinand David Schoeman 
ed., 1984); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); Daniel J. 
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002). 
136 See Gavison, supra note 135, at 428. 
137 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY 
RECORDS 49–52, 57–58 (3d ed. 2013); Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in So-
cial Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227, 229–34 (2012).  Information privacy can be contrasted 
with decision privacy, the latter encompassing decisions about bodily autonomy like what 
medical treatment to receive.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989) (“As we have pointed out before, ‘[t]he cases some-
times characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different 
kinds of interests.  One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.’” (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977))). 
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tably articulated by Alan Westin138 and Charles Fried,139 and has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court.140 
So understood, privacy can be seen as a constitutive element of 
human autonomy, or as a key element in the identity formation and 
mental freedom that is central to a fully realized autonomy.141  In the 
words of Thomas Nagel, “The boundary between what we reveal and 
what we do not, and some control over that boundary, are among the 
most important attributes of our humanity.”142  Without privacy, peo-
ple will engage in harmful self-censorship not only in what they will 
say and in what they will do, but even in what they will think as they 
internalize an awareness that they are always watched.143  And the abil-
 
138 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is communicated to others.”).  “Most definitions of privacy agree on a 
core concept:  that privacy is the claim of an individual to determine what information 
about himself or herself should be known to others.  This also involves when such infor-
mation will be communicated or obtained and what uses will be made of it by others.”  
ALAN F. WESTIN, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY:  FROM THE HEBREWS AND GREEKS 
TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4 (presented and distributed at the 2009 Privacy Law Schol-
ars Conference, and quoted with permission). 
139 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968) (“[P]rivacy [i]s that aspect of social 
order by which persons control access to information about themselves.”).  Others like to 
frame privacy as a right to deprive.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon:  A 
Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 32 (1995).  Others frame it is a limitation 
on others’ access.  See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 135, at 423 (“Our interest in privacy, I ar-
gue, is related to our concern over our accessibility to others:  the extent to which we are 
known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to 
which we are the subject of others’ attention.  This concept of privacy as a concern for 
limited accessibility enables us to identify when losses of privacy occur.”). 
140 See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763 (“[B]oth the common law and the literal understand-
ings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or her 
person.”).  The Court rejected a more “cramped notion of personal privacy” relying upon 
secrecy.  Id. 
141 See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:  TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF SOCIAL LIFE 81–82 (2010).  Nissenbaum’s insightful gathering and characterization of 
philosophies is highly recommended.  See id. at 67–78; see also Thomas P. Crocker, From 
Privacy to Liberty:  The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23–25 (2009) 
(explaining autonomy through a privacy lens). 
142 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 4 (1998). 
143 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 75–76; Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Con-
forming Effect:  First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 465, 483–93 (2015); Reiman, supra note 139, at 41–42.  Even merely a reminder of 
the concept of surveillance affects behavior.  See, e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being 
Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412 (2006), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1686213/ (finding that people contrib-
uted nearly three times as much for drinks when an image of human eyes was displayed 
nearby); Terence C. Burnham & Brian Hare, Engineering Human Cooperation, 18 HUM. 
NATURE 88, 99 (2007), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12110-007-9012-2 
(finding an increase in simulated public good behavior when an image of a robot with 
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ity to think freely and critically is essential to full development of 
one’s moral character.144  This is not to deny, of course, that social 
pressures can be beneficial ones,145 but instead only to recognize that 
they can also be debilitating in the extreme.146 
Furthermore, without privacy people are (at best) stunted in their 
ability to form meaningful and diverse relationships, as those rela-
tionships depend upon a volitional, gradual, and granular mutual 
sharing of information.147  As Nagel explains, “selective intimacy per-
mits some interpersonal relations to be open to forms of exposure 
that are needed for the development of a complete life.  No one but 
a maniac will express absolutely everything to anyone, but most of us 
 
human eyes was displayed); Max Ernest-Jones et al., Effects of Eye Images on Everyday Cooper-
ative Behavior:  A Field Experiment, 32 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 172, 176 (2011), 
https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/daniel.nettle/ernestjonesnettlebateson.pdf (finding that 
people littered half as often when an image of human eyes was displayed nearby); see also 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (recog-
nizing the internal significance of feeling watched); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT 
RISK 92–95 (2007) (building off Foucault’s work and others to describe the impact of los-
ing “public anonymity”). 
   In the words of Edward Bloustein, “[t]he man who is compelled to live every minute 
of his life among others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is 
subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dignity.  
Such an individual merges with the mass.  His opinions, being public, tend never to be 
different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones; 
his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth 
and to become the feelings of every man.  Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he 
is not an individual.”  Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:  An An-
swer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964).  Or in the words of Ruth Gavison, 
if subjected to a world without privacy, “[w]e would probably try hard to suppress our 
daydreams and fantasies once others had access to them.  We would try to erase from our 
minds everything we would not be willing to publish, and we would try not to do anything 
that would make us likely to be feared, ridiculed, or harmed.  There is a terrible flatness 
in the person who could succeed in these attempts.”  Gavison, supra note 135, at 443. 
144 See Jeroen van den Hoven, Information Technology, Privacy, and the Protection of Personal Data, 
in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 301, 315–16 (Jeroen van den 
Hoven & John Weckert eds., 2008); NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 78. 
145 See William H. Simon, Rethinking Privacy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/william-simon-rethinking-privacy-surveillance 
(“The second trope of the paranoid style is the portrayal of virtually all tacit social pres-
sure as insidious.”). 
146 See, e.g, Azar Nafisi, Surveillance States, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/14/books/review/surveillance-states.html (“It stays with you, that 
fear.  It burrows under the skin.  Even after you escape and are thousands of miles or 
many years away, you will still sometimes feel you are being watched.  Something within 
you has been permanently damaged by the terrible knowledge of the human capability 
for cruelty and your own weaknesses in the face of it.”). 
147 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 84; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE:  THE 
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 89, 209–18 (2000); Fried, supra note 139, at 477; 
Gavison, supra note 135, at 450.  See generally IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, SOCIAL 
PENETRATION:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973). 
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need someone to whom we can express a good deal that we would 
not reveal to others.”148  As Ferdinand Shoeman explains, 
“[i]nformation appropriate in the context of one relationship may 
not be appropriate in another.”149  Indeed, devoid of intended and 
appropriate context, information can present a vastly incomplete if 
not completely inaccurate assessment.150  A spouse, for example, 
should have sufficient knowledge of a partner that she can place any 
new information in nearly its correct context, but a stranger, ac-
quaintance, or even fairly good friend might totally misperceive its 
relevance.  As Andrew Taslitz has noted, not only does other-
assessment have practical manifestations (e.g., loss of a job oppor-
tunity), but psychologically we hold other-assessment dear.151 
Without privacy, people thus have less fully developed characters 
and relationships, which in turn are the constituent elements of a ro-
bust marketplace of ideas, associations, and religions.152  In other 
words, privacy may be critical to the individual in a manner necessary 
to identity formation and to robust small-scale personal relationships, 
but it is ultimately of collective societal importance, especially to a de-
mocracy.153  Thus, it is not surprising that Alan Westin found a corre-
lation between political philosophy and privacy throughout western 
civilization.154  And there are other ramifications.  Without privacy 
there is increased identity theft, stalking, and other information-
 
148 Nagel, supra note 142, at 10. 
149 Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS, 
supra note 135, at 403, 408. 
150 See WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890), http://psychclassics.
asu.edu/James/Principles/prin10.htm (“Properly speaking, a man has as many social 
selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their 
mind.  To wound any one of these his images is to wound him.  But as the individuals who 
carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many dif-
ferent social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. 
He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups.” (empha-
sis omitted)). 
151 Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect Privacy in 
Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 218–19 (2014). 
152 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 86; PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 221 
(1995). 
153 See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912–18 (2013) (arguing 
that diminished privacy shrinks the capacity for democratic self-government); Gavison, 
supra note 135, at 455 (“Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fos-
ters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a de-
mocracy.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:  Personal Information and Public Sec-
tor Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560–63 (1995). 
154 See WESTIN, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 138, at 4–5, 9. 
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based or assisted crimes.155  And given asymmetries of power, distor-
tions in information privacy tend to run solely in one direction, or at 
least are not distributed equally, benefiting some at the costs of oth-
ers.156 
Of course, to assert that information privacy is about control is not 
to say that one must exercise absolute control.  Most rights, and per-
haps all rights, are not absolute, and in this case absolute control is 
unthinkable.  First, nobody would benefit from exercising control to 
achieve absolute seclusion.157  And society could not permit absolute 
control, not only because it would have too great a cost to the social 
order, but also because once any information about me is known to 
another person, my right of privacy control runs up against their 
right of free expression.158 
Fortunately, people innately understand this and rarely, if ever, 
expect absolute control.  But they do wish to exercise some control, 
even as they are becoming increasingly disillusioned regarding their 
ability to do so.159  As sociologist Christena Nippert-Eng explains 
based upon her recent studies, “[I]t became clear that what I now 
think of as the process of ‘selective concealment and disclosure’ plays 
an important role in how we try to achieve privacy.  This is the daily 
activity of trying to deny or grant varying amounts of access to our 
 
155 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 78; Van den Hoven, supra note 144, at 311–12 (“in-
formation-based harm”). 
156 See NISSENBAUM, supra note 141, at 79; Van den Hoven, supra note 144, at 312–13 (“in-
formational inequality”). 
157 See Gavison, supra note 135, at 440 (“We start from the obvious fact that both perfect pri-
vacy and total loss of privacy are undesirable.  Individuals must be in some intermediate 
state—a balance between privacy and interaction—in order to maintain human relations, 
develop their capacities and sensibilities, create and grow, and even to survive.”). 
158 Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975) (striking down a state 
statute prohibiting the publication of a rape victim’s name). 
159 See MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 30 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (finding “91% of [American] adults 
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that ‘consumers have lost control over how personal infor-
mation is collected and used by companies.’”); Peter H. Schwartz et al., Patient Preferences 
in Controlling Access to Their Electronic Health Records:  A Prospective Cohort Study in Primary 
Care, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED., S25, S27 (2014) (finding almost half of patients will hide 
certain health information from their health-care providers if given the choice).  The 
Schwartz study is perhaps especially interesting, because as Amitai Etzioni has pointed 
out, merely asking a person if she would like more privacy is akin to asking whether she 
would like more health; better information requires recognizing that more of ‘x’ might 
have some other cost.  Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN 
APPLIED ETHICS 253, 253 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds., 2005). 
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private matters to specific people in specific ways.”160  Nippert-Eng 
unsurprisingly found disparate people each trying to achieve their 
preferred balance.161 
Thus, while any replacement is far less crisp and easy, I have long 
been a critic of the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine, which 
tries to artificially categorize all information as either totally secret 
(purely private) or freely available to law enforcement (effectively 
purely accessible).162  Attempting to force people to maintain absolute 
secrecy in order to have any degree of constitutional protection is un-
realistic and counter-productive.163 
But what does a control theory of information privacy have to say 
about investigatory time machines?  Obviously at least as to govern-
ment created ones, there is a serious tension, and it is a tension that 
goes to the heart of privacy’s motivations.  Can we fully develop as 
human beings, with the necessarily divergent ideas and willingness to 
express them that a thriving democracy requires, if the government is 
 
160 CHRISTENA NIPPERT-ENG, ISLANDS OF PRIVACY 2 (2010).  Thus, consistent with a control 
theory, “The goal is to achieve selectivity in both [disclosure and concealment]—to care-
fully choose exactly what is disclosed and concealed, to whom, and how.”  Id. at 7.  When 
people were individually interviewed and asked the very general question, “What does 
privacy mean to you?”, a large majority in some manner described the control theory.  See 
id. (noting that the answers of forty-five of fifty-seven participants could be so classified); 
see generally MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES ABOUT 
PRIVACY, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf (finding that Americans want 
to control who can access their personal information but doubt they are currently able to 
do so). 
161 NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 160, at 8 (“For the people in this study [] ‘good’ privacy exists 
when the things they want to be private are as private as they want them to be.  It’s a won-
derfully subjective, relativistic standard . . . . [C]ontrol over the amount and type of dis-
closure and concealment is what really defines their assessment of the situation.” (em-
phasis omitted)); see also id. at 5 (positing “[w]hen we think of privacy [] what we really 
think of is a condition of relative inaccessibility.  Any point on the scale has both a degree 
of privateness and a degree of publicness associated with it” (emphasis omitted)). 
162 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment 
Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH 431 (2013); Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely 
Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011) [here-
inafter Timely Demise]; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:  Pro-
tecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 
(2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States:  How to Apply the Fourth 
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 
CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2006); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun?  A Tech-
nologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507 (2005) 
[hereinafter Nothing New]. 
163 See NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 160, at 5 (“[A]cquiring privacy is only part of the problem 
. . . . The totality of the task is to achieve a balance between the need and desire for both 
privacy and publicity—for a certain degree of concealment and disclosure, for denying 
and granting access to others.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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always watching?  No.  Of course, in even the most totalitarian re-
gimes there have proved to be some persons who exercise unpopular 
autonomy, but then truly pervasive technology like we have today has 
never before been available.  And, more importantly, as Ruth Gavison 
explains, “Even if we grant that privacy may not be a necessary condi-
tion for autonomy for all, . . . it is enough to justify it as a value that 
most people may require it.  We are not all giants, and societies 
should enable all, not only the exceptional, to seek moral autono-
my.”164  An ideal democracy requires thoughtful participation from 
far more than just a few. 
Thus, there is good reason to be extremely skeptical of any gov-
ernment-mandated time machines, and outside of the particular in-
stances in which they have historically been used (e.g., banking, 
pharmaceuticals, and hotels), we might do best to forbid them, 
whether constitutionally or otherwise.  Indeed, it might be wise to re-
consider even those we have historically permitted; the Supreme 
Court in Patel struck down a 116-year-old reporting ordinance.165  But 
at the very least, a drone hovering high overhead that records all pub-
lic movements seems problematic, as do mammoth databases of digi-
tal information that can later be searched.  On the other hand, 
broad-based surveillance does have benefits.  More inclusive surveil-
lance benefits from a genuine check in the political process, and can 
more evenly distribute the costs and provide superior accountabil-
ity.166  So, is it possible to have our cake and eat it too?  If there are 
sufficiently robust access, use, and disclosure limitations, can they ev-
er ameliorate the very serious privacy concerns?  I first address 
whether such use restrictions could be found within the Fourth 
Amendment, and then turn to the wisdom of their adoption in the 
very limited context of police body cameras. 
III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT USE RESTRICTIONS AND POLICE BODY 
CAMERAS 
In a prescient article from 1995, Harold Krent argued that—
whatever definitions of search and seizure are required to make it 
happen—the uses to which law enforcement can put lawfully ac-
 
164 Gavison, supra note 135, at 450. 
165 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2464 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
166 See Simon, supra note 145 (“[B]road-reach electronic mechanisms have an advantage in 
addressing the danger that surveillance will be unfairly concentrated on particular 
groups; targeting criteria, rather than reflecting rigorous efforts to identify wrongdoers, 
may reflect cognitive bias or group animus.”). 
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quired information should be governed by the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness requirement.167  According to Krent, “Rapidly devel-
oping technology has thrust the use issue to the forefront:  what the 
government does with information may now threaten privacy more 
than the collection itself.”168  The Ganias Second Circuit panel adopt-
ed such a use restriction:  even if it was permissible for investigators to 
retain the nonresponsive computer data for such a long period, it was 
not permissible to search through that data—to use that data—in a 
new investigation, even pursuant to a newly obtained search war-
rant.169  Although it is not clear that Krent would agree with this par-
ticular use limitation,170 he recognized that generally such limits are 
conducive to the control theory of information privacy:  each differ-
ent use of the data interferes with a person’s ability to control for what 
purposes information about her is utilized.171 
Neither the Ganias panel nor Krent argued that use restrictions 
should be the sole Fourth Amendment restrictions:  the original law 
enforcement acquisition remains subject to traditional restraints.  For 
example, merely agreeing to limit use would of course not itself justi-
fy compulsory copying of Ganias’ hard drives.  But there might be 
circumstances when it is impossible to get the desired law enforce-
ment safety benefit without completely abandoning front-end acquisi-
tion restraints, as with broad scale, panvasive drone surveillance, or 
with broad scale, panvasive internet surveillance for malware.172  In 
 
167 Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks:  Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 49, 49–51, 51 n.14 (1995). 
168 Id. at 51.  Krent went on to argue for a more specific rule, namely that the only reasona-
ble uses are ones “disclosed or implicit at the time of the underlying seizure,” requiring 
the state to “precommit to all uses of information and items seized.”  Id. at 53; see id. at 
85–92 (developing this proposed limitation). 
169 See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 
246, 250 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding the warrantless DNA testing of lawfully seized items 
from a non-arrestee to constitute an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search); Orin S. 
Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence:  The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Da-
ta, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing that limited use restrictions are plausible giv-
en the necessary over-seizure in the digital search context); cf. Commonwealth v. Arzola, 
470 Mass. 809, 820 (Mass. 2015) (holding the DNA testing of lawfully seized items from 
an arrestee did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search). 
170 Krent would permit a later use when “the subsequent use would have itself legitimated 
the initial search.”  Krent, supra note 167, at 93.  That would seem true of the later search 
warrant in Ganias.  However, as prescient as Krent’s article was in 1995, he did not con-
sider the unique nature of computer searches, which might (or might not) alter his con-
clusions. 
171 Id. at 51 nn.14 & 18, 92 n.199. 
172 Christopher Slobogin has coined the term “panvasive” “to capture the idea that modern 
government’s efforts at keeping tabs on the citizenry routinely and randomly reach across 
huge numbers of people, most of whom are innocent of any wrongdoing.”  Christopher 
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each instance, assuming complete automation, the key privacy harm 
seems to occur only upon human viewing, or use.  Of course, this 
does not mean the sole privacy harm occurs upon use.  If human-
programmed algorithms are making decisions based upon content, 
that seems a relevant use regardless of the lack of direct human ob-
servation.173  And, as described above, knowing that all of our move-
ments, online or off, will be recorded for potential later perusal can 
very meaningfully chill those actions.  Jeremy Bentham long ago real-
ized that constant observation was not necessary in his Panopticon; 
merely its potential was sufficient to achieve the same results.174  Thus, 
European courts have recently rejected requirements that internet 
service providers retain information for defined periods of time.175 
So, we should be extremely cautious in accepting ex-post use and 
dissemination controls as a substitute for—as opposed to a supple-
ment to—front-end acquisition controls.  But as part of this calculus 
we should recognize the benefits of broad access, including its more 
uniform distribution and thus greater political accountability.  As I 
argued some ten years ago, whether the issue is DNA databanking or 
a thermal scan of homes or a millimeter wave scan of persons (as now 
takes place at airports), advanced notice and broad and uniform ap-
plicability trigger the protections of the political process in a way that 
most contemporary policing does not, and this should factor into 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness.176  In this, I was building upon 
 
Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723 (2014). 
173 See Henderson, Timely Demise, supra note 162, at 47–48 (responding to argument of Rich-
ard Posner); see also SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 130 (“Whether or not anyone actually 
looks at our data, the very facts that (1) they could, and (2) they guide the algorithms 
that do, make it surveillance.”). 
174 See The Panopticon, UCL BENTHAM PROJECT, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-Project/
who/panopticon (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).  George Orwell used the same concept in his 
1984:  “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any 
given moment.  How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any in-
dividual wire was guesswork.  It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the 
time.  But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to.  You had to 
live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you 
made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”  GEORGE 
ORWELL, 1984, at 4 (1949). 
175 See Davis v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2015] QBD 3665, 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/davis_watson_order.pdf 
(invalidating UK data retention law); Case C-293, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for 
Commc’ns, 2014 E.C.R. 845, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text
=&docid=150642&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN (invalidating the 2006 Data Retention Di-
rective). 
176 See Henderson, Nothing New, supra note 162, at 555–59. 
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the arguments of William Stuntz177 and the Supreme Court’s school 
drug testing cases.178  Christopher Slobogin has recently developed 
the concept into a more rich theory of representative democracy—
relying upon the constitutional scholarship of John Hart Ely—that 
would provide judicial review even where the government activity 
does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure.”179 
But again, whatever the benefits of even a well-functioning politi-
cal process, there are strong reasons to be cautious.  As Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor argued in personally rejecting the Court’s permissive 
regime of drug testing for student athletes, we have a strong tradition 
against general warrants, and “[b]lanket searches, because they can 
involve thousands or millions of searches, pose a greater threat to lib-
erty than do suspicion-based ones, which affect one person at a 
time.”180  Nonetheless, it would be just as wrong to ignore the fairness 
benefit of broad applicability, as it would to think a “misery loves 
company” conception would be ideal across the board (the latter of 
which would adopt wholesale the hated general warrants of our 
founding period).181 
It seems there might be limited, relatively narrow circumstances in 
which we should embrace solely use restrictions, and I submit that 
one of them might be for law enforcement body cameras.  Of course, 
perhaps this is an unfairly easy case, because in order for the camera 
to capture anything, the law enforcement officer should already be 
lawfully present, a criterion that brings its own sometimes-significant 
front-end restrictions.  But such recording nonetheless creates time 
machines, and lots of them:  there are almost a million law enforce-
ment officers in the United States.182  With officers on duty at all 
 
177 See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2166 (2002) 
(“[S]preading the cost of policing through a larger slice of the population . . . reduces 
the odds of voters demanding harsh and intrusive police tactics secure in the knowledge 
that those tactics will be applied only to others.”). 
178 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (“In many respects, we 
think, testing based on ‘suspicion’ of drug use would not be better, but worse.”).  In its 
drug testing cases, the Court has also been swayed by use restrictions, holding searches 
reasonable in part based upon the limited government use of positive testing.  See Hen-
derson, Nothing New, supra note 162, at 560–61. 
179 See Slobogin, supra note 172, at 1724, 1733–37. 
180 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 667 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
181 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (deriding a 
“misery loves company” Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
182 NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MEMORIAL FUND, LAW ENFORCEMENT FACTS:  KEY 
DATA ABOUT THE PROFESSION, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/ (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2016); see also By the Numbers:  How Many Cops Are There In the USA?, THE SKEPTICAL 
LIBRARIAN (Aug. 26, 2014), http://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2014/08/26/by-the-
numbers-how-many-cops-are-there-in-the-usa/. 
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times, watching over mostly innocent behavior as well as some crimi-
nal, if every one records his or her entire shift, that is a staggering 
amount of data. 
Those recordings will psychologically affect the officers, and not 
only in the sense of promoting good behavior.  As discussed above, 
nobody does well to be under constant surveillance (though, interest-
ingly, to many thousands of Americans working in retail and other 
industries it is probably already their daily reality—albeit without ac-
companying audio—and these workers might have little to no prom-
ises regarding ex-post use and dissemination).  Nor is it the case that 
these recordings will merely duplicate what officers could themselves 
personally explain.  Instead, high quality cameras would record all 
sorts of events and details never noticed by the officers, and potential-
ly permanently store them for later high-tech perusal (e.g., zoom in 
and slow down).183  Moreover, for things an officer does notice—
which will include highly traumatic events—the digital record will 
remain forever pristine, whereas memories quickly degrade and even 
fade entirely.184  Such cameras would record not “only” events taking 
place in public, but instead would record everywhere officers go, in-
cluding the interiors of our homes and therefore potentially under 
every bed and into every drawer.  So even if officer presence already 
has an access (and thus acquisition) limitation, it would not necessari-
ly follow that nothing more should be required for the further intru-
sion of recording.185 
However, these panvasive qualities of officer recording also make 
for some of its benefits.  As long as there have been police, we have 
had to rely not only upon their perceptions of what they observe, but 
upon their memories of those perceptions.  Both perception and 
 
183 Of course, sometimes a camera’s preserving things unnoticed is precisely its utility.  See 
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS:  EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS AND 
PRIVACY THREATS 5–6 (2015). 
184 On the benefits of human forgetting, see Henderson, supra note 11, at 708–09.  As Bruce 
Schneier has stated in the online context, “I used to say that Google knows more about 
what I’m thinking of than my wife does.  But that doesn’t go far enough.  Google knows 
more about what I’m thinking than I do, because Google remembers all of it perfectly 
and forever.”  SCHNEIER, supra note 15, at 22.  And it gets still more privacy invasive, be-
cause via data mining Google can learn correlations and patterns in your thinking of 
which you have never been consciously aware. 
185 At the very least such videos should not all become public records, as might be the de-
fault in some jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Jessica Bruha, Local Law Enforcement Testing Body Cams, 
NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.normantranscript.com/news/local-
law-enforcement-testing-body-cams/article_c61e8ff4-4052-11e4-b4eb-eb2c7f02e600.html 
(“[D]ue to a law going into effect . . . the video becomes public record and the depart-
ment is obligated to turn over a copy to any member of the public.”). 
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memory are fallible, and recollection thereof subject to falsification.  
Of course, we have done what we can.  Because memory dissipates 
quickly, it is helpful when police contemporaneously record their 
perceptions, and hence we value the ubiquitous police report (which 
also “freezes” the account, making later fabrication more difficult).  
With the advent of readily mobile photography, police could better 
preserve those observations deemed sufficiently important, and pho-
tography of crime scenes thus became routine.186  With the advent of 
tape recording, certain police-citizen interactions were recorded.187  
And with the advent of videotaping, we became accustomed to its 
benefits in certain contexts, such as video recordings of traffic stops 
via cameras fixed in police vehicles.  But when that videotaping made 
it to the interior of the home, it caused concern, a concern that 
reached the Supreme Court in 1999 in the case of Wilson v. Layne.188 
 
186 Yet that photography has sometimes proved controversial when used to fill “gang books” 
of known and suspected gang members for use in future investigations, when part of a re-
staged arrest to permit the press a perp walk, or—in its most modern manifestation—
when an officer took his own selfie during a perp walk.  See Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 
202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding unconstitutional a restaged perp walk because it had no 
legitimate law enforcement purpose); Brown v. Pepe, 42 F. Supp. 3d 310, 316 n.10 (D. 
Mass. 2014) (holding an officer’s “selfie” was at most a de minimis privacy intrusion); 
Commonwealth v. Cao, 644 N.E.2d 1294, 1296–99 (Mass. 1995) (holding the procedure 
used to obtain a photograph for a gang book did not constitute a seizure); People v. Ro-
driguez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 663–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding unconstitutional a 
stop used to obtain a photograph for a gang book). 
187 Tape recording likewise sometimes proved controversial, especially in the undercover 
context.  See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 
373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963). 
188 526 U.S. 603 (1999); see also Oziel v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1284, 
1296, 1302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (not deciding the constitutionality of police videotaping 
the execution of a search warrant but refusing media access to that footage).  Since Wil-
son, media presence has continued to cause potential Fourth Amendment violations.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Hendrixson, 234 F.3d 494, 496 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that media 
involvement at the execution of a search warrant in a home was a Fourth Amendment vi-
olation, but did not require exclusion of evidence); Smart v. City of Miami, 2015 WL 
3409329, at *12–13 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2015) (finding plaintiff’s § 1983 claim sufficient to 
overcome summary judgment based on the theory that police inviting a crew from “First 
48” to film plaintiff’s home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Carr v. Montgom-
ery Cnty., 59 F. Supp. 3d 787, 798 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding a plausible § 1983 claim for 
bringing a third-party film crew into a home to videotape a warrantless search); Frederick 
v. Biography Channel, 683 F. Supp. 2d 798, 799–802 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding a plausible 
§ 1983 claim against a media company where plaintiffs were detained longer than police 
needed for arrest, just so that a film crew could arrive to cover it); Conradt v. NBC Uni-
versal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding plausible § 1983 and inten-
tional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against media defendant for their show “To 
Catch a Predator” having an unusually pervasive presence and influence throughout an 
investigation that led the target to eventually commit suicide); Thompson v. State, 824 
N.E.2d 1265, 1266, 1268–69, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a film crew’s pres-
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As part of “Operation Gunsmoke,” United States Marshals were 
working with local Maryland police to apprehend dangerous crimi-
nals, including one Dominic Wilson.189  Unfortunately, the address in 
police files was that of Wilson’s parents, so when police entered the 
home to execute an arrest warrant—accompanied by invited repre-
sentatives of the media—what they found was Dominic’s father 
roused from bed and dressed only in briefs and Dominic’s mother in 
a nightgown.190  Before police were made aware of, or at least were 
convinced of, their mistake, they forcibly subdued the elder Mr. Wil-
son at gunpoint while a photographer from the Washington Post 
took photographs.191  The Court unanimously held that the officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment by bringing representatives of the 
media into a home entered pursuant to a warrant.192  However, the 
Court acknowledged government interests that could be furthered by 
law enforcement’s own recording:  accurately publicizing efforts to 
combat crime (furthering education and deterrence), deterring and 
detecting police abuse, protecting the safety of officers, and preserv-
ing evidence.193  Thus, “it might be reasonable for police officers to 
themselves videotape home entries.”194 
The benefits the Court proffered are real and can be significant.  
As for evidence preservation, recording can preserve evidence with-
out requiring its physical removal;195 preserve evidence that would 
 
ence during a strip search in the defendant’s motel room violated the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights and warranted exclusion of the evidence gained during that search). 
189 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606. 
190 Id. at 607. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 614.  Eight Justices believed, however, that before this decision the law was not 
clearly established, and therefore that the officers enjoyed qualified immunity.  See id. at 
615; id. at 618 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).  On the merits, the Court also distin-
guished circumstances in which a party is brought in the home to assist the police in their 
task, as when a citizen is brought along to identify stolen property.  See id. at 611–12. 
193 See id. at 612–13. 
194 Id. at 613. 
195 This can serve First Amendment, privacy, law enforcement, and practical values.  As for 
the First Amendment, see, for example, City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 566 
N.E.2d 207, 213 (Ohio  Mun. 1990) (approving of officers executing a search warrant by 
videotaping an allegedly obscene art exhibit, which negates otherwise serious concerns of 
pre-adjudication censorship).  As for privacy, in some circumstances it might be difficult 
for police to distinguish what is subject to seizure, and if probable cause justifies a greater 
seizure, recording might provide a lesser invasion.  For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 294–95 (Mass. 2002), defendants were believed to have purchased 
household items with public funds.  In such a case, there might be nothing about tainted 
items that immediately commands attention, yet there might be probable cause (fair 
probability) to seize a great portion of them.  Similarly, federal agents involved in the 
2005 search of Representative William Jefferson’s home opted to photograph documents 
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otherwise be destroyed by investigatory or non-investigatory govern-
ment actions, or simply by the passage of time;196 and preserve evi-
dence in its most pristine form, allowing a judge or juror to view it 
herself.197  One could imagine recordings being used to routinely de-
cide such contested issues as whether a person consented to an entry 
or search, and if so, the scope of that consent; whether a reasonable 
officer would have believed a person to be in need of immediate as-
sistance; whether there was a fair probability that evidence would be 
imminently destroyed; whether police exceeded the authorization of 
a warrant; or whether an officer reasonably believed deadly force was 
justified.198  To be sure, no single video is “perfect,” as the camera 
 
for which they alleged probable cause, and thus for which they could have executed a 
“plain view” warrantless seizure, because the documents were not directly responsive to 
the warrant’s list of seizable items.  United States v. Jefferson, 571 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 
(E.D. Va. 2008).  As for practicality, there will of course be instances in which physical sei-
zure is impractical or even impossible.  See, e.g., People v. Bambino, N.Y. L.J. 25 (Aug. 4, 
1992) (Nassau Cnty. Justice Ct. 1992) (photography/videography where defendants were 
believed to have an apartment in their basement in violation of applicable zoning law); 
State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 530 (Iowa 1981) (photography of tire tracks).  And as 
for law enforcement interests, it might be necessary to preserve evidence without tipping 
off a suspect.  See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1330 (2d Cir. 1990) (au-
thorizing a “sneak and peak” or “covert entry” warrant to search a property for evidence 
of cocaine manufacturing that would be photographed but not physically seized). 
196 This interest arises whenever police entry is predicated upon emergency aid, during 
which their protective actions will sometimes destroy unseen or in-the-moment unappre-
ciated evidence (or during which a malicious officer could destroy “undesirable” evi-
dence).  It also arises when victims’ bodies are to be moved.  See, e.g., Forbes v. State, 1995 
WL 241722, *5–6 (Tex. App. 1995) (permitting photography and videotaping prior to 
medical examiner and photography by medical examiner); State v. Wright, 558 A.2d 946, 
950–51 (R.I. 1989), abrogated on other ground recognized by State v. Brennan, 627 A.2d 842, 
848 (R.I. 1993) (same); State v. Anderson, 599 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Or. App. 1979) (permit-
ting videotaping prior to removal of victim’s body); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 488–90 
(Del. 1967) (permitting photography prior to removal of victim’s body).  Or when there 
is a fire.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 289 (1984) (reaffirming and applying 
these principles); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510–12 (1978) (establishing three 
tiered structure for searches of fire scenes); Schultz v. State, 593 P.2d 640, 643 (Alaska 
1979) (permitting photography during emergency fire search); Dubbs v. State, 157 
S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942).  And sometimes evidence is naturally evanes-
cent, such as a pool of blood not yet dried into a carpet, which might indicate something 
about the time of an attack or other relevant event.  See, e.g., Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 
942 (Wyo. 1983) (permitting photography to preserve evanescent evidence, though in an 
opinion fraught with scientific error and weak legal reasoning), overruled in part on other 
grounds, Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 692 (Wyo. 1995). 
197 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (relying upon dash camera video to hold of-
ficers acted reasonably in using deadly force).  The Supreme Court has noted this eviden-
tiary advantage in the context of undercover recordings.  See United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745, 753 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963). 
198 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (noting dash camera video that was 
presumably used in determining consent to search); United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 
622 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting use of dash camera video to determine reasonable suspi-
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perspective can itself suggest a cognitive frame and thereby affect 
these myriad determinations.199  But it is far better than without.  In 
the straightforward words of the Alaska Supreme Court in the context 
of recording custodial interrogations, “a recording will help trial and 
appellate courts to ascertain the truth.”200 
Thus, preservation has secondary benefits, including in deterring 
and detecting police abuse.  There are ample recorded examples, 
from detectives playing Wii Bowling during a home search,201 to acci-
dent investigators “do[ing] a little Walt Disney to protect [a] cop” 
who rear-ended another vehicle.202  The most prominent recent ex-
 
cion); Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 2015) (using dash camera to de-
termine excessive force); Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d 853, 862 (6th Cir. 2012) (us-
ing dash camera to determine whether reasonable suspicion was materially disputed); 
Lee v. Anderson, 616 F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting jury’s use of video in deter-
mining whether deadly force was reasonable and relying upon video in denying claim of 
insufficient evidence); United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(noting magistrate’s use of dash camera video in determining consent); United States v. 
Abarza, No. 1:14–cr–179–MC, 2015 WL 69556684, at *1–3 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2015) (noting 
the usefulness of dash camera footage and using it to negate allegations like “high-crime 
area” and nervousness); Burnett v. Unified Gov. of Athens-Clarke Cnty., No. 3:08-CV-04 
(CDL), 2009 WL 5175296, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 22, 2009) (noting defendant’s refusal to 
consent in dash camera video); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1143–44 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2015) (using dash camera footage to determine the extent of physical manipu-
lation during a Terry stop); Lampkin v. State, 470 S.W.3d 876, 888–89 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2015) (using dash camera footage used to determine whether defendant was intoxicat-
ed); Scott v. State, 559 So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that video of 
search warrant execution did not conflict with trial court’s findings regarding knock and 
announce); Kimberly Kindy & Julie Tate, Police Withhold Videos Despite Vows of Transparency, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/10/08/
police-withhold-videos-despite-vows-of-transparency/ (discussing utility of police body 
cameras in fatal shootings); Richard Perez-Pena, Officer Indicted in Shooting Death of Un-
armed Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2015, at A1 (describing use of officer body camera in 
murder indictment).  This is of course a benefit in the videotaping of interrogation.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 454–56 (Iowa 2006) (relying upon and encouraging 
such recording). 
199 See generally Kwangbai Park & Jimin Pyo, An Explanation for Camera Perspective Bias in Volun-
tariness Judgment for Video-Recorded Confession:  Suggestion of Cognitive Frame, 36 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 184–85 (2012). 
200 Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Alaska 1985). 
201 See Steve Andrews, Polk Sheriff Disciplines Wii-Playing Deputies, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 11, 2009, 
at 4; Steve Andrews, A Wii Bit Distracted, TAMPA TRIB., Sept. 22, 2009, at 1. 
202 See Tonya Alanez, Ex-Hollywood Officers Accused of Falsifying Crash Report Now Face Federal 
Lawsuit, SUN SENTINEL (June 4, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-06-
04/news/fl-hollywood-cops-federal-lawsuit-20100604_1_andrea-tomassi-officer-dewey-
pressley-officer-joel-francisco; Tonya Alanez, DUI Charge Dropped After Cops Accused of Crash 
Cover-Up, SUN SENTINEL (July 30, 2009), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-07-
30/news/hollywood_1_dui-charge-finkelstein-broward-state-attorney; see also Jim Dwyer, 
Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at A1, B4 (report-
ing on videotape contradicting police reports concerning arrests at the 2004 Republican 
National Convention); Jim Dwyer, A Switch Is Flipped, and Justice Listens In, N.Y. TIMES 
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amples might be the shootings of Walter Scott and Samuel Dubose, 
each of which resulted in murder charges against the police officer.203  
It seems self-evident that video would deter (and where that fails, de-
tect) abuse, an inference supported by police recording in Rialto, 
California.  In the first year of body camera recording, complaints 
against officers fell by 88% and use of force by officers fell by almost 
60%.204  Thus, in Judge Shira A. Scheindlin’s 2013 order holding un-
constitutional the New York Police Department’s stop and frisk tac-
tics, she required a trial program of officer body cameras.205  To be 
most effective, that video must record all police-citizen interaction—
lest officers only turn it on when it serves their purposes206—and be 
 
(Dec. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/nyregion/08about.html?
pagewanted=print&_r=0 (reporting on an officer falsely claiming a recorded interroga-
tion had never taken place); John Eligon, No Jail for Ex-Officer Over Toppled Bicyclist, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A26 (reporting on an incident in which a New York City officer 
body slammed a bicyclist and then, adding insult to injury, charged him with attempted 
assault and disorderly conduct); Sasha Goldstein, Police Dash Cam Video Exonerates New Jer-
sey Man, Leads to Indictment of Cops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/police-dash-cam-video-exonerates-nj-man-
implicates-cops-article-1.1701763 (reporting on dash camera footage that exonerated a 
man from evading arrest and proved police had falsified records); David A. Graham, The 
Death of Jeremy Mardis and the Honesty of the Police, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/11/the-death-of-jeremy-mardis-and-
trustworthy-police/415437/ (reporting police lying about an incident that left a 6-year-
old boy dead and the body camera footage that proved it); Kim Minugh, Faked Reports Put 
Cop in Jail, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/mobile/bees-
best/article2577255.html (reporting on an officer who provided false information in a  
number of police reports); Joe Sharkey, A Constitutional Case in a Box of Cash, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2009, at B5 (reporting on an illegitimate and abusive detention of an airplane 
passenger for carrying a significant amount of cash). 
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tamper-resistant.207  And when it comes to deterring and detecting 
abuse, turnabout is fair play.  Recording can shield police against 
false allegations of abuse as well as deter or at least detect poor citizen 
decisions, perhaps including some that caused those previously unre-
corded use of force incidents. 
So, given the myriad benefits of tamper-resistant, always-on officer 
recording—where “always on” includes cameras with a significant, 
typically-overwritten buffer meant to become permanent when trig-
gered by an officer-citizen interaction—it seems such recording is 
worth the privacy cost.  But this merely means police should record.  
It remains to be determined—or should remain to be determined—
what can be done with those recordings, which of course preserve 
immense amounts of otherwise ephemeral irrelevant information like 
the takedown of an innocent man in his bedclothes in Wilson v. 
Layne.  The mere preservation of that information is a meaningful 
harm, if nothing else because the relevant parties know there is al-
ways a risk of its further consumption and dissemination.208  And thus 
recording can also harm law enforcement interests if it deters citizen 
cooperation and assistance where persons fear criminal reprisal.  
Thus, as an administrative matter in police department guidelines, as 
a legislative matter, and—I would argue—as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment (and state constitutional analog) reasonableness, there 
should be use and disclosure limitations on that data.  These would 
include security from unauthorized access, need-to-know limitations, 
audit logs, and destruction schedules.209 
For example, viewing the footage of a home search should at least 
sometimes itself constitute a Fourth Amendment search, just like pe-
rusing a seized computer.  Reentering the home after completion of 
the search would of course require a new warrant,210 and just as a 
 
sponding  to  calls  for service  or  engaged  in  any  law  enforcement-related encounter 
or activity”). 
207 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 202 (describing prosecution use of a misleadingly edited police 
video; the prosecution was dropped when defense attorneys obtained the unedited ver-
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(July 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/sandra-blands-arrest-footage-
shows-fallible-video-can/ (describing recent instance in which odd edits to a controversial 
police video seem to be only technical glitches). 
208 For a telling example, see Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 295–96 (Mass. 2002), 
in which the court describes in detail the many innocent details preserved by the record-
ing of a home search.  In today’s “reality television” pseudo-celebrity obsessed culture, 
many might be most interested in the criminally irrelevant portions of a search. 
209 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY 
RECORDS §§ 25-6.1, 25-6.2 (3d ed. 2013); see also Ill. S.B. 1304 § 10-20(a)(7). 
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search of a seized hard drive yields previously unknown information, 
viewing of video will yield information not noticed by officers, and—
given video enhancement capabilities—information not previously 
noticeable.  Moreover, the resource and legal restraints are far differ-
ent when any number of officers can view video in their offices than 
when those officers are on the scene executing a search warrant gov-
erned by the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, potentially in-
cluding a judicial warrant.  Thus, just as courts have begun to recog-
nize that “digital is different” in other contexts, courts should here 
recognize a meaningful difference in kind despite law enforcement 
officers traditionally being permitted to re-examine physical items in 
their possession.  The over-seizure inherent in the recording merits a 
different result. 
So understood, in the limited context of police body cameras, the 
benefits of complete recording seem to outweigh the costs, and 
therefore this is a government time machine that I would permit sub-
ject only to meaningful access, use, and dissemination controls.  This 
of course leaves for future work the development of a taxonomy as to 
when acquisition restrictions are more or less important, and what 
should be the constitutional and statutory rules and administrative 
best practices.  But it provides a critical perspective as we approach 
these decisions, seeing them for what they are:  Fourth Amendment 
time machines. 
CONCLUSION 
We are in the midst of dramatic techno-social change.  In the 
words of Christena Nippert-Eng: 
It’s as if a distinct cultural climate change is underway.  The ocean has 
risen, shrinking our islands of privacy and even submerging many of 
them altogether.  Like Atlantis, perhaps, some private spaces and times 
and matters are fading into the realm of folklore—even legend—their 
very existence destined to rest one day on the unsubstantiated claims of 
prior generations.211 
The ability of technology for the first time to feasibly record and store 
most all behavior—both online and off—is certainly a tectonic shift.  
It seriously threatens privacy, and thus all of privacy’s myriad individ-
ual and societal benefits. 
Of course, any such shift can be exaggerated, and in some sense 
little is ever new.  In 1890, with the advent of the portable camera, a 
newspaper bemoaned that, “This season there is something at the 
 
211 NIPPERT-ENG, supra note 160, at 3–4. 
972 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
seaside worse than sharks.  It is the amateur photographer.”212  Yet we 
somehow made it through, sufficient privacy intact.  Laws have long 
required that certain records be retained, and businesses have long 
retained far more than what the laws require. 
Nonetheless, differences in scope at some point become differ-
ences in kind, and I believe there is utility in recognizing today’s digi-
tal records for what they are—investigative time machines—and 
openly confronting whether their benefits justify their costs.  Where 
they do, we should utilize access, use, and dissemination restrictions 
for our privacy.  And in those instances in which only a panvasive 
time machine will do, and in which its benefits still outweigh its costs, 
we can rely solely upon those ex post restrictions.213  But these time 
machines are fraught with great danger to our humanity and to our 
democracy, and thus should be approached with a healthy, if not vig-
orous distrust.  Thus, in this Article I have taken only a baby step, 
recommending a use restriction regime for police officer body cam-
eras, recognizing that officer presence builds in acquisition restraints.  
Legislatures should provide frameworks for these recordings, requir-
ing reasonable guarantees of secure storage and appropriately re-
stricting and disciplining errant access, use, and dissemination.214  If 
those restrictions ultimately prove unworkable or insufficient in this 
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limited context, then we will have learned that they certainly cannot 
alone be trusted in other spheres. 
